Nineteen-point Grand Slam

If you’re thinking “some bad bidding!”, I agree with you. If you ask me why 5 ♦, I’d have to admit (with much shame) that holding such a monster, I wanted to play the hand and blissfully ignored the club option. If you’re baffled why West did not bid after South’s double, you’re not alone. If you’re baffled why North passed twice holding five clubs and no diamonds, you’re not alone. So let’s leave the actual bidding aside.

What would be a reasonable bidding sequence? Obviously, North–South reach 7 ♣.

(Completely irrelevant fact: the odds that you will pick up a 9–4–0–0 hand pattern randomly are 1 in more than 103 500.)

The Losing Trick Count

There is a popular tool used in hand evaluation, for those who don't know, called the losing-trick count. Check out Phillip Alder's short description of it. His columns are also put up on that website.

I suggest that you bookmark that site. And while you're at it, bookmark Bridge Clues too.

Duckling Play

The following deal occurred at the Junior National Bridge Championship held between 28 Feb and 2 Mar 2007 in Surat. The IITM team comprising Guthi, Kedar, Ram, and Tota, finished third, just two VPs below the runners-up. Guthi and Kedar produced a shocking result on the following board against an IIT Kharagpur pair. (Since the deal was not recorded on paper and is here reproduced from Guthi's memory, some unimportant details may be wrong.)

After some hyper-aggressive bidding by Kedar (North), Guthi, South, declared an entirely reasonable 6 NT. The contract makes whenever the pack is missing a red ace. Guthi knew there were additional chances in finesses.

The lead was a spade and declarer won on the table, to lead a low diamond. South's 5 ♥ had shown two aces. East put two and one together, getting four, and knew that West held no ace. He correctly ducked the diamond to let the weird finesse against the jack or the king lose.

Declarer took the jack and led a low heart. West too, meanwhile, had put two and one together and knew that East held no ace. He rightly ducked the heart so that the jack could lose to the queen.

Of course, it didn't, and declarer played ♦ 10 from the table now, for another finesse. East was no doubt seized by fears of declarer's long diamonds getting established. So he cleverly ducked again to leave declarer stranded in dummy.

By now, South was convinced that one or other chance had come good and was anxious to repeat the mixture, so he played another heart. West suddenly spotted the winning defence. Up he went with the ace and reached for the diamond that wasn't there. Twelve tricks for +1430 and 13 IMPs.

I suppose defenders were miffed at their bad luck—both aces were onside for declarer. Guthi, meanwhile, was probably disappointed he couldn't take three “finesses” each in the red suits to bag thirteen tricks.

North's 4 NT was hasty. First, the combined hands have 30–31 points—not enough for a notrump slam, especially given the 4–3–3–3 pattern. Second, are you wondering why he bid slam knowing they were off two aces? Because 5 ♠, he figured, might be passed by South, since North bid spades first. (If spades had been unbid, 5 ♠ would have asked South to bid 5 NT.)

Guthi subsequently clarified that he would not have passed 5 ♠, because with long spades, responder's correct action is to start out by transferring to spades after opener's 2 NT rebid (by bidding 3 ♥). Anyway, North should think about this before bidding 4 NT. Since he plans to bid 6 NT after a 5 ♣ or 5 ♠ response to Blackwood, and will be forced to bid 6 NT even after a 5 ♥ response, he must blast to 6 NT (A 5 ♦ response is impossible on the bidding). In that case, even a non-duckling West might fail to set the contract. Of course, five-notrump king-asking Blackwood after receiving the bad news is third-degree masochism.

Last, how do you play the hand in 6 NT? It is safe to assume the aces are split, because the contract wasn't doubled (yes, even if you're not on lead, you must double an opposing 6 NT holding two aces, because it's highly unlikely that (i) declarer can find twelve top winners in two suits, and (ii) partner will lead a wrong suit). In addition, you must make the assumption that both defenders were sleeping during the bidding, otherwise the contract is down the moment dummy hits the table. Because even one alert defender can tip his partner off by cashing his ace at the first opportunity.

Since you need five (yes, ruefully, five) red winners, you must get them immediately. Guthi's line is probably the only that had any chance (some chance!). You have to take a view on who holds which ace. One might think that there's a slim chance that West is the kind of doublomaniac that would double either of the two Blackwood responses to show his heart ace (not unusual doublomaniacal behaviour), forgetting that he would be on lead. And that since he didn't he doesn't hold it. Pretty thin, but it's something. However, as you can see, it leads to the wrong conclusion on this layout.

Guthi evidently needed none of this, because, like a magician inspired by the devil, he turned two normal healthy human defenders into ducklings and made his contract with a swagger.

Shocking Auction

(I read the following piece in Tricks of the Trade by Terence Reese and David Bird. I was shocked first by the auction and then by the article's comment on it. I reproduce it here for your pleasure.)

Sometimes the defenders try to obscure the picture that declarer is trying to build. The French star, Paul Chemla, emerged the victor of such a struggle on this deal:

Chemla's protective call of two hearts was a characteristic thrust. Most player would have re-opened with a double but Chemla was no doubt keen to protect his king of diamonds should the hand be played in hearts.

West led a spade to the jack and ace, and Chemla, from his modest base, set out to draw trumps. West played the 10 and dummy's queen won. When the trump ace was cashed, West followed with the jack, hoping to persuade declarer that he had started with K J 10 alone.

Chemla would have none of this. Placing West with four trumps for the double, he turned his attention to the clubs. West let all five rounds pass, refusing to ruff, but was then thrown in with one of the trumps he had been treasuring. He had to concede a trick to declarer's ♦ K, bringing Chemla's total to nine—two trumps, five clubs, a spade and a diamond.

‘You bid a three-card suit headed by the 4?’ queried North.

‘It was the only way to make game, partner,’ Chemla explained.

Doubling for Penalty

This deal occurred at a tournament in Mylapore Club. As West I held (for the first time in my life, as far as I remember) a Yarborough, so naturally my expectations from the deal were high.

East's second double was “please bid, partner” and my 3 ♦ was made in agony. But gloating over his honour stash, East could not resist doubling the final contract.

The lead was ♦ K and I ill-advisedly played ♦ 8 (“play top of sequence when not trying to win the trick”). Taking this to be encouragement (the correct interpretation would be that I held four diamonds), partner continued with a diamond.

After much stumbling, declarer made 10 tricks for +790. “A trump continuation will give me a hard time”, he grumbled. Partner was furious about my misleading play to the first trick. As you can see, declarer can get six spades and four tricks from the rounded suits.

The contract cannot be set by any defence. The play can proceed in a number of ways, but the fact is that the contract is remarkably good. With a random distribution of the remaining cards between East and West, the contract makes over 50 % of the time. If the honours are concentrated in one hand (as the bidding reveals), the chances of success are much improved.

The point here is that it is foolish to double four spades. True, you have four quicktricks. But it should be clear that North has considerable distributional assets, and setting the contract more than one seems unlikely. So the odds on the contract going down have to be at least 5 : 3 (−5 IMPs if they make the contract and +3 IMPs if you are able to set it one trick). Since East's quicktricks are concentrated in two suits and since West is guaranteed to produce no trick, the odds don't figure to be that high. You could argue that North's bidding was shaky, passing South's single raise, but I think the double was still wrong. Change East's 21 points to include the four aces, and the double is automatic.

The penalty double was not East's only bad call. When West passed South's two-spade bid, he denied having as many as six or seven points. From that point on, chances of game for East–West are pretty slim, unless West holds hearts, for which East doesn't have exceptional support. The second double is eminently correct because a partscore (at least) should certainly be sought. However, after North's 3 ♠, 4 ♦ is asking for trouble.

West may make only the four diamonds and the two top clubs. Realistically, West will most likely be able to finesse the clubs for six and a half tricks—seven sure tricks if he has the queen. A fifth diamond with West will provide one more. I think 7–8 tricks are the normal expectation. Passing 3 ♠ will almost certainly end the auction, and there is no dignity in getting socked for 500 or 800 “sacrificing” against 140 or 170. On the actual layout West can make eight tricks in diamonds. (Luck deserted us that board. At the other table, the result was an incredible 2NT bid and made by East.)

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Guthi